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The purpose of this paper is to investigate the effect of better compliance with corporate 
governance regulation on managerial accruals (discretionary accruals) in New Zealand listed 
companies. Unlike previous research of earnings management, Jones model (Jones 1991), 
Modified Jones model  (Dechow, Sloan, & Sweeney, 1995) and Performance Matched 
Accruals Model  (Kothari, Leone, & Wasley, 2005) this research focuses on free cash flow as 
a measure of discretionary accruals instead of cash flow from operating activities. Univariate 
and multivariate regression analysis was done on 70 New Zealand listed firms over the period 
of 2000 - 2007 (inclusive). Results found that better compliance with corporate governance 
reduces discretionary accruals implying lower managerial opportunistic behaviour. 
Consistent with existing theories and models of discretionary accruals, this research 
documents that free cash flow increase managerial discretion by comparing with commonly 
used accruals model such as Jones Model, Modified Jones Model and Performance Matched 
Accruals Model. This study provides insights to regulators in developing corporate 
governance and financial reporting guidelines. It suggests that ‘Comply or Explain’ form of 
soft regulation reduces managerial discretion with stock exchange listing. This research uses 
a comparative analysis of traditional discretionary accrual measure with free cash flow 
approach of discretionary accruals. Moreover, an integration approach of discretionary 
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1 Introduction 
 
This paper documents the association between corporate governance compliance and 
performance matched free cash flow discretionary accruals. Free cash flow (FCF) is the 
accumulation of cash flow from operating and investing activities and includes all cash flows 
relating to property, plant and equipment and investment in the balance sheet. It has been 
suggested that free cash flow is better matched with earnings (Dechow & Ge, 2006), and 
there is a considerable body of literature that defines total accruals as the difference between 
net income and cash flow from operating activities (Dechow, Sloan, & Sweeney, 1995; Xie, 
Davidson, & DaDalt, 2003). This traditional approach has been extended by Dechow & Ge 
(2006) who define total accruals as the difference between earnings and free cash flow. 
Recent research studies have used the free cash flow approach to accruals measurement 
(Bukit & Iskandar, 2009). 
Opportunities for earnings management are higher with the increase of free cash flow 
in business and, in the absence of proper monitoring of management; the risk that money 
might be misused by investing in less profitable projects is increased. Research studies on 
corporate governance and earnings management suggest that better corporate governance 
measures such as having independent directors, supervisory committees (such as the audit 
committee, nomination committee and remuneration committee), and quality external audits, 
can reduce opportunistic behaviour by management. 
Cash flow is an important basis for accrual measurement (Ingram & Lee, 2007). Prior 
literature on earnings management focused on identifying and expanding the set of variables 
that influence discretionary accruals, using cash flow from operating activities (Leuz, Nanda, 
& Wysocki, 2003; McNichols & Wilson, 1988; Richardson, Sloan, Soliman, & Tuna, 2005; 
Siregar & Utama, 2008; Xie, et al., 2003). However, free cash flow has not been considered 
when calculating total accruals in previous studies. As stated above, FCF is the combination 
of cash flow from operating activities and investing activities, which reflects the impact of 
cash spending on fixed assets and investments. Companies operating with high FCF provide 
greater opportunities for opportunistic behaviour by management. Therefore it is appropriate 
to suggest that FCF better reflects accruals for individual firms. 
This paper is different in compare with existing research based on US environment 
and contributes in three ways; firstly, New Zealand corporate regulation is comparatively 
more flexible than USA where management is strictly monitored, controlled and penalised 
for wrong forecast and earnings engineering. Moreover market regulators and the New 
Zealand Institute of Chartered Accountants (NZICA) are more reluctant to identify earnings 
management. Secondly, corporate ownership structure in New Zealand tends to concentrate 
into fewer shareholders whereas US firms are owned by scattered owners caused more 
possibility of earnings management. Finally, monitoring mechanisms such as corporate 
governance regulations in New Zealand are ‘comply or explain’ (non-mandatory) in 
comparison with US ‘Act based’ regulations. 
General findings from prior research indicate that discretionary accruals are affected 
by corporate governance factors such as the composition of the board of directors, CEO 
duality, the composition of the audit committee, and auditor independence (Bukit & Iskandar, 
2009; Klein, 2002, 2003; Larcker, Richardson, & Tuna, 2007; Richardson, et al., 2005; 
Romano, 2005; Siregar & Utama, 2008). Firm specific characteristics such as firm size, 
leverage and profitability have also been documented as determinants of discretionary 
accruals. Companies operating for a long period of time are expected to have improved 
corporate governance practices (Fasterling, 2005). Stakeholders, therefore, get the benefits of 
better monitoring activities. This paper extends earlier research studies by incorporating 
company age and stock exchange listings as determinants of earnings management. 
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Furthermore, this paper also argues that a company operating for a long time under listing 
status reduces earnings management. 
The paper proceeds as follows: Section two presents a literature review of earnings 
management and corporate governance. Hypotheses are developed in Section three. Sections 
four and five explain the sampling process used and the research methodology followed. In 
Section six, univariate and multivariate analyses are discussed, which leads to Section seven, 
the conclusion of the paper.  
 
2 Literature Review 
 
The thread of earnings management essentially commenced in 1985 with the publication of 
Healy’s research, closely followed by DeAngelo’s research in 1986. Both of them focused on 
total accruals and changes in accruals as a measure of discretionary acts by management in 
order to manage earnings. Healy (1985) found that accrual policies of managers are related to 
bonus incentives in their employment contracts. However, DeAngelo (1986) found sharp 
contrast with Healy (1985). Both authors used accrual methodology and each found evidence 
of income manipulation in a different setting. DeAngelo calculated non-discretionary 
accruals based on lagged total accrual whereas Healy measured earnings based on comparing 
means of total accruals scaled by total assets. Neither of these researchers separated out non-
discretionary factors – this first occurred when Jones (1991) used a linear regression 
approach and controlled for non-discretionary accrual factors including sales revenue and 
property, plant and equipment. 
A different approach to earnings management research was introduced by McNicols 
and Wilson (1988) who focussed on specific accruals within industry settings. McNicols and 
Wilson (1988) modelled earnings management on a single accrual factor, the provision for 
bad debts, instead of collective factors of accruals using Generally Accepted Accounting 
Principles (GAAP). Moyer (1990) examined the incentives for commercial bank managers to 
adjust accounting measures used by regulators and legislators. Petroni (1992) investigated the 
extent to which the biased application of accounting discretion by managers of 
property/casualty insurers affects the estimation error in claim loss reserves, finding that 
managers of financially weak insurance companies bias estimates of claim loss reserves 
downwards relative to financially strong insurers. 
The behaviour of earnings around a specified benchmark is another approach to 
earnings management research. Burgstahler and Dichev (1997) provide evidence that 
earnings management occurs in order to avoid reporting decreases in earnings or losses. It has 
also been suggested that earnings management occurs in order to report positive profit, 
sustain recent performance, and meet analysts’ forecasts, in that order (Degeorge, Patel, & 
Zeckhauser, 1999).  
Dechow et al. (1995) introduced the Modified Jones Model, which has become one of 
the most widely-used models in earnings management research. The Modified Jones Model 
includes an adjustment to sales based on the change in the amount of receivables. Whereas 
the Jones Model implicitly assumes that discretion is not exercised over revenue in either the 
estimation period or the event period, the Modified Jones Model assumes that all changes in 
credit sales in the event period result from earnings management (P. M. Dechow, et al., 
1995). The Jones Model focuses on the manipulation of bad debt expenses but underestimates 
managed earnings when sales are manipulated. In contrast, the Modified Jones Model 
overestimates the magnitude of earnings management (Ronen & Yaari, 2007). 
The following five sub-sections survey the relevant literature on regulation and 
corporate governance indicators related to earnings management. 
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2.1 Regulation and Earnings Management 
 
Regulation is an important determinant of earnings management. Both voluntary and 
mandatory regulations increase disclosures to shareholders, reduce information asymmetry, 
and managerial discretionary power to manage earnings. Disclosure of information reduces 
the cost of capital and provides  higher earnings quality (Francis, Nanda, & Olsson, 2008). A 
weak legal environment might facilitate opportunistic earnings management, which results in 
lower earnings quality. Although soft regulations strengthen the rights of minority 
shareholders, they cannot rely on the courts as legal processes remain slow and ineffective 
(Ball, Kothari, & Robin, 2000). They also found that earnings management is inversely 
related to the strength of the regulation and litigation environment. 
Stock market authorities have become increasingly anxious about the implementation 
of corporate governance regulations following many high profile corporate collapses and 
accounting manipulations that have occurred in recent years. Corporate governance 
regulations were introduced following the Cadbury Report in 1992 (Cadbury, 1992) and, 
more recently, tightened in the Sarbanes-Oxley Act 2002, but recent literature suggests that 
corporate governance regulations are irrelevant and competing regulators implement them 
irrespective of necessity (Romano, 2005). Nonetheless, this flow of regulation allows 
regulators to facilitate better policy and allows flexibility to the organisations as one code 
does not fit all sectors and companies. 
 
2.2 Board of Directors and Earnings Management 
 
GAAP requires firms to use accrual accounting, but this also allows management to control 
the timing of accrual expenditures (Xie, et al., 2003). However, it is over to the board of 
directors to monitor and control these discretionary acts of management. Independent outside 
directors provide a measure of protection against this agency problem (Weisbach, 1988), so it 
is expected that the composition of the board will be a factor that influences the extent to 
which a company engages in earnings management since independent outsider directors 
monitor management more effectively than inside directors (Vafeas, 2000; Xie, et al., 2003). 
Unfortunately, non-executive directors may not act as good monitors if they have a 
significant financial interest in the company (Luan & Tang, 2007; Peasnell, Pope, & Young, 
2005; Tosi, Shen, & Gentry, 2003), they have other directorships that compete for their time 
(i.e. they are too busy), they have limited time to devote to the affairs of the company, or they 
owe their positions to existing management and therefore their loyalty is more to that 
management than to the company (Hart, 1995). A large board may include a number of 
independent directors, but this may also result in greater bureaucracy and less functionality 
than a board that is numerically smaller. Nevertheless, a large board with more independent 
directors is better positioned to prevent earnings management (Xie, et al., 2003). 
 
2.3 Board Committees and Earnings Management 
 
Vance (1983) argues that the audit committee, the compensation committee and the 
nomination committee all have significant influence on corporate activities while Klein 
(2003) argues that the overall composition of the board of directors has no influence on firm 
performance, but that the audit committee does. It is therefore likely that the structure of 
board committees and their composition will impact management’s willingness to manage 
earnings. Xie et al. (2003) argue that the executive committee only plays an indirect role 
whereas the audit committee has a more direct role in controlling earnings management. 
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Consequently, an active, well-structured and properly functioning audit committee may be 
able to reduce, if not eliminate, earnings management. It is therefore expected that 
professionally efficient audit committee members will play a significant role in preventing 
earnings management, and that an audit committee comprising a large proportion of 
independent directors will ensure effective monitoring. This expectation is in line with the 
recommendations of Levitt’s Blue Ribbon Panel (Xie, et al., 2003). The Cadbury Report 
(Cadbury, 1992) also suggests that the audit and remuneration committee should be 
comprised mainly or entirely of non-executive directors. 
 
2.4 Auditor and Earnings Management 
 
Prior research also shows that auditor and audit quality play an important role regarding the 
control of earnings management (Balsam, Krishnan, & Yang, 2003; Siregar & Utama, 2008; 
Teoh & Wong, 1993). They also argue that the Big 4 auditors have greater independence 
from the client as compared to non-Big 4 auditors. Companies audited by Big 4 firms have 
less discretionary accruals than others because the auditors play a significant role in 
constraining opportunistic earnings management behaviour. However, the auditor’s ability to 
be independent is influenced by the incentives they receive, and a recent study has  
investigated whether non-audit services compromise auditor independence or whether the 
consequences are that the auditor allows pernicious earnings management (Cahan, Emanuel, 
Hay, & Wong, 2008; Habib & Islam, 2007). 
 
2.5 Ownership Concentration, Securities Exchange Listing and Earnings Management 
 
Management stockholding reduces agency conflicts because they are both a principal (since 
they are shareholders in their own right) and an agent (for the other shareholders). It is 
therefore expected that this dual role should result in a lower incidence of earnings 
management. Previous studies have found a negative relationship between management 
shareholding and the absolute value of abnormal accruals (Warfield, Wild, & Wild, 1998). 
Healy (1985) found that CEOs tend to manage earnings to maximise their bonus while Klein 
(2002) found CEO shareholdings to be no predictor of earnings management. Institutional 
ownership provides wider monitoring and greater control of firm information and reduces 
earnings management (Hermes, Postma, & Zivkov, 2007; Siregar & Utama, 2008). 
 
3. Hypothesis Development 
 
Five hypotheses are developed in order to test the association between corporate governance 
and discretionary accruals.  
 
3.1 Regulations and Earnings Management 
 
The basic premise of capitalism is that individuals pursue their own interest (Smith, 1776). 
Appropriate corporate laws and regulations are vital for the efficient working of a capitalistic 
economy in order to maximise individual and national wealth. There is a widespread belief 
that only strict laws and regulatory controls can prevent management acting for their own 
self-interest (Drobietz, 2002). However, an appropriate legal structure may help to protect 
investors and their investments, and also ensures a ‘proper’ environment that generates a 
return on investment. Corporate governance regulations should lead to improved systems of 
internal control within companies. Leuz et al. (2003) examined systematic differences of 
earnings management and found a negative relationship between corporate governance 
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regulations and the level of earnings management. Leuz et al. (2003) argue that insiders have 
incentives to conceal their private control benefits from outsiders. 
Prior research also found that financial disclosure practices have a positive impact on 
investors’ confidence, reduce information asymmetry and result in a lower cost of capital 
(Francis, et al., 2008). Similarly, corporate governance and other regulations help 
management to structure strong internal control systems and monitor shareholders’ interests. 
Tightening rules and regulations and the adoption of self regulation by market participants 
are the result of the growing conviction that better corporate governance will deliver higher 
shareholder value (Bartle & Vass, 2007; Drobietz, 2002). Increased regulation enhances 
strong corporate governance, and together with a more independent and effective board of 
directors and board committees, leads to a reduction in managerial discretionary decisions 
resulting in earnings manipulation. The first regulation-related hypothesis, expressed in the 
null form is therefore: 
01:H There is no relationship between the presence of corporate governance 
regulations and discretionary accruals.  
 
3.2 Corporate Governance Compliance and Earnings Management 
 
An effective and efficient board of directors is the prime component in a system of corporate 
governance. However, if the board is dominated by executive directors, the opportunity to 
indulge in ‘discretionary financial decisions’ will be greater than if the board was dominated 
by independent directors. Similarly, CEO duality, where the CEO is also the chair of the 
board of directors, creates an environment that enables discretionary decisions concerning the 
management of earnings. It is suggested that the use of appropriate board committees such as 
an audit committee, remuneration committee, and a nomination committee, will act to reduce 
discretionary managerial decisions. For example, having at least one independent director 
with financial expertise on the audit committee will enhance the level of corporate 
governance, which, in turn, should reduce discretionary accruals. Similar arguments can be 
mounted for having independent directors on the remuneration committee (since they will 
then be able to rationalise the remuneration and incentives offered to management), and on 
the nomination committee (to remove the possibility of nepotistic appointments). 
The results of empirical research suggest that outside directors are able to more 
effectively monitor and reduce agency costs, which results in lower discretionary accruals 
(Jiang, Lee, & Anandarajan, 2008; Klein, 2002; Vance, 1983). Similarly, effective and 
independent board committees are expected to monitor internal control systems better. All of 
these attributes of best practice generally form part of a robust set of corporate governance 
regulations, so compliance with these regulations should strengthen the level of corporate 
governance. This leads to the following null hypothesis related to corporate governance 
compliance: 
0 2 :H  There is no relationship between the level of compliance with corporate 
governance regulation and discretionary accruals. 
 
3.3 Control Shareholding and Earnings Management 
 
A zero-based agency cost indicates that the firm is owned by a single owner-manager. 
Agency costs exist when ownership is separated from management, i.e. when the manager 
holds less than 100 percent of the equity. Agency costs increase with the reduction in the 
proportion of managerial ownership. Companies that operate with a controlling shareholder 
have less independent decision-making compared to companies where there is no controlling 
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shareholder, since the controlling shareholder has access to information and, by definition, 
controls the activities and decisions of the board of directors (Varma, Patel, & Naidu, 2009). 
Minority shareholders have little or no influence on board decisions, and may feel 
insecure when the corporate environment is not regulated. Independent management have 
better control over decision-making if the shareholding is scattered amongst many owners. 
Therefore, a non-mandatory corporate governance regulatory environment may not be 
sufficient to protect minority shareholders. This leads to the following null hypothesis 
concerning a controlling shareholder:  
03 :H  There is no relationship between the presence of a controlling shareholder 
and discretionary accruals.  
 
3.4 Business Operation Tenure and Earnings Management 
 
A company operating in society is expected to have a robust system of internal control and to 
comply with relevant regulations (Kole & Lehn, 1997). As discussed previously, effective 
systems of controlling and monitoring management lead to a reduction in discretionary 
accruals. It can be argued that a mature company that has been operating for a period of time 
will have such systems in place, and that its stakeholders will be actively monitoring the 
financial position of the business. This argument is supported, at least in part, by prior 
research which provides evidence that growing and newly established firms have more 
discretionary accruals than mature firms (McNichols & Wilson, 1988; Shen & Chih, 2007). 
However, all firms, irrespective of maturity, could manage their earnings – for example, 
Dechow & Dichev (2002) show that longer operating cycles generate greater uncertainty, 
give rise to more estimation errors, and result in lower quality of accruals. Thus the evidence 
regarding the relationship between the maturity of the company and earnings management is 
mixed. The current research will provide further evidence about this relationship, so the 
fourth null hypothesis is as follows: 
0 4 :H  There is no relationship between business operating tenure and 
discretionary accruals. 
 
3.5 Listing Tenure and Earnings Management 
 
The New Zealand Stock Exchange Listing Rules and the Corporate Governance Best Practice 
Code 2004 ("New Zealand Corporate Governance Best Practice Code," 2004) both provide 
criteria with which listed companies must or should (respectively) comply. Compliance with 
these criteria should result in an environment whereby opportunities for earnings 
management will be limited. It is therefore expected that the longer a company has been 
listed, the more likely they will have a lower level of discretionary accruals.  Hypothesis five, 
expressed in the null form, is therefore:  
05 :H  There is no relationship between the listing tenure of a company and 
discretionary accruals. 
In essence, this hypothesis posits that a regulated environment of corporate 
governance will reduce discretionary accruals by imposing more accountable and effective 
monitoring systems.   
 
4 Sample 
 
The sample of companies for this study is selected from companies listed by the New 
Zealand Stock Exchange Limited (NZX). The NZX comprises two markets: the New Zealand 
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Stock Market (NZSE), the main board where premium equities are traded, and the New 
Zealand Alternative Market (NZAX) which lists companies that are comparatively new and, 
typically, in a rapid growth phase. The latter market allows these young companies to issue 
equities comparatively cheaply as compared to the main board. It should be noted that 
corporate governance research in New Zealand has not previously included the NZAX 
companies because this board is a recent addition to the market. The inclusion of the NZAX 
should therefore add depth to the previous studies of corporate governance in New Zealand.  
The sample period covers the years from 2000 to 2007, inclusive. To be included in the 
sample, companies must have operated over the entire period of the study. By the end of 
August, 2008 a total of 153 companies were listed by NZX. Consistent with previous 
research, twenty nine finance companies were excluded since they are subject to different 
regulations and reporting procedures. Thirty five companies did not provide a complete set of 
financial reports usable for this research while financial information about nineteen 
companies was not available. 
Corporate governance information such as the composition of the board of directors, 
the board committees, and audit information was collected manually from IRG Ltd’s deep 
archive section while financial data was collected from DATASTREAM. Company websites 
also provided information about operating cycles and the length of time that the company had 
been listed on the stock exchange. The final sample of seventy companies was then divided 
into different industry sectors using the NZX categories in Table 1, as follows: 
 
Table 1  
Sector Composition of Sample 
Sector Group Companies Observation Percentage 
Energy 8 64 11.43% 
Goods 11 88 15.71% 
Investment 5 40 7.14% 
Primary 9 72 12.86% 
Property 5 40 7.14% 
Service 32 256 45.72% 
Total 70 560 100% 
 
5 Research Methodology 
 
This section describes the research methodology, including the measurement of the research 
variables and the statistical techniques and other models used in this research. 
 
5.1 Measurement of Variables 
 
This section describes how the dependent and independent variables were measured and how 
discretionary accruals were calculated. 
 
5.1.1 MEASURE OF DEPENDENT VARIABLE 
 
Discretionary accruals were measured using Jones Model (Jones, 1991), the Modified Jones Model 
(1995) and the Performance Matched Model (Kothari et al, 2005). Free cash flow was used to measure 
the performance matched model as follows: 
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itNDA  (non-discretionary accruals) is divided by 1−itA  (total assets in year t-1 for firm i) ( 
Total Accruals = Net Income before extraordinary items less Free Cash Flow which includes 
cash flow from  operating activities and cash flow from investing activities 
0α   = constant 
itREV∆  = revenue in year t less revenue in year t-1 for firm  
itAR∆  = receivables in year t less receivables in year t-1 for firm i 
itPPE  = gross property, plant and equipment in year t for firm i 
1−itA   = total assets in year t-1 for firm i 
itε   = error term in year t for firm i 
ipNDA  = non-discretionary accruals 
1−itROA  = lagged rate of return on assets 
 
5.1.2 MEASURE OF INDEPENDENT VARIABLES 
 
In this research regulation, corporate governance index, control shareholding, NZX listing 
tenure, and operating tenure are independent variables that are explained as follows.  
 
5.1.2.1 Regulation 
 
The regulation effect will be measured by a dummy variable since it is anticipated that 
corporate governance regulations will enhance corporate governance compliance and reduce 
opportunistic behaviour of management. The opportunistic behaviour of management is 
indicated by discretionary accruals,  therefore for the years 2000-2003, the regulation dummy 
variable will be ‘0’ to indicate the existence of discretionary accruals when there were no 
regulations, otherwise the regulation dummy variable will be ‘1’. It is expected that there will 
be a negative correlation between the regulation dummy variable and discretionary accruals. 
 
5.1.2.2 Corporate Governance Index  
 
Corporate governance mechanism consists of a complex set of interrelationships so using a 
single factor or variable to measure corporate governance is challenging. Researchers tend to 
examine the overall impact of a much broader corporate governance mechanism by 
formulating a corporate governance index (CGI) and rating systems (Berghe & Levrau, 2004; 
Strenger, 2004). In this study, the index accumulates all aspects of corporate governance 
including board of directors’ attributes, external auditor, supervisory committees, 
management shareholdings, and listing tenure of firms. The index is calculated as: 
)2......(100x
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where: 
CGI it    = Corporate governance index for firm i in year t; 
itCVCG    = Cumulative value of corporate governance for firm i in year t; 
itMPVCGC    = Maximum possible value of corporate governance compliance for firm i in 
year t; 
The corporate governance index is a composite measurement based on dichotomous 
variables and actual values measured (Lara, Osmab, & Penalvac, 2007; Larcker & 
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Richardson, 2004; Larcker, Richardson, & Irem, 2005). A CGI is prepared using twenty 
indicators as follows in Table 2. 
Table 2  
Measure of Corporate Governance Index 
Board of Director Score 
No of director This variable is assigned a value of 1 if the number of directors is not less than the median, and 0 otherwise. 
Board Independence This variable is assigned a value of 1 if the ratio of independent directors is not less than the median, and 0 otherwise 
Board Tenure This variable is assigned a value of 1 if the combined tenure (in years) of all directors in the sample company exceeds the median, otherwise the value is 0. 
Busy Board This variable is assigned a value of 0 if the total outside directorships is greater than median, otherwise the value is 1. 
Board Meeting This variable is assigned the value of 0 if the number of board meetings was less than the median, otherwise the value is 1. 
CEO duality This variable is assigned the value of 0 where the CEO has this dual role, 1 otherwise. 
CEO Experience This variable is assigned the value of 1 if the CEO has not less than the median number of years of experience and 0 otherwise. 
Board Committee Score 
No of board committee Companies that have all three board committees are coded 1, 0 otherwise 
Audit committee size This variable is assigned the value of 1 if the audit committee was not smaller than the median, 0 otherwise 
Audit committee financial 
expertise 
This variable was assigned the value of 1 if the company followed this 
recommendation, 0 otherwise. 
Audit committee meeting This variable is assigned the value of 0 if the audit committee met less frequently than the median and 1 otherwise 
Audit committee 
experience 
This variable is assigned a value of 1 if the experience of the audit committee 
was not less than the median, and 0 otherwise. 
Chair of audit committee This variable is assigned a value of 0 if the same person was appointed as chair of both committees, and 1 otherwise. 
Independent director in 
audit committee 
This variable was assigned a value of 0 if the number of independent directors 
on the audit committee is less than the median, and 1 otherwise. 
Independent director ratio 
in nomination committee 
This variable is assigned a value of 0 if the ratio of independent directors on the 
audit committee is less than the median, and 1 otherwise. 
Audit Score 
Big 4 This variable is therefore assigned a value of 1 if the company is audited by a ‘Big 4’ firm, and 0 otherwise 
Auditor tenure This variable is therefore assigned a value of 0 if the company is audited by the same auditor for more than five years and 1 otherwise 
Ratio of audit fee and non-
audit fee 
This variable is assigned a value of 0 if the ratio of fees paid to the auditors is 
more than the median, and 1 otherwise 
Director shareholding and Listing Score 
Director shareholdings This variable is assigned a value of 1 if the company is also listed on an overseas stock exchange and 0 otherwise 
Dual listing status The variable is assigned a value of 0 if the proportion of director shareholding is greater than the median, otherwise the value is 1. 
 
5.1.2.3 Control Shareholding 
 
If one entity holds at least half of the issued shares, they are considered to have the 
controlling shareholding of the company. Companies having a more concentrated ownership 
are more likely to have higher discretionary accruals as compared to companies with less 
concentrated ownership. The controlling shareholder has access to more information and, by 
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definition, can control the company’s governance processes and internal control systems. 
This variable will be coded ‘1’ if the company has a controlling shareholder and ‘0’ 
otherwise. It is expected that there will be a positive relationship between this variable and 
discretionary accruals. 
 
5.1.2.4 NZX Listing Tenure 
 
Companies that are listed on the stock exchange are subject to higher monitoring by investors 
and regulators. It is expected that all stakeholders would access news releases from the 
company as and when they occur, which suggests that it would be more difficult for such 
companies to have discretionary accruals. It is posited that the longer a company has been 
listed, the less likelihood there will be discretionary accruals. It is expected that there will be 
a negative relationship between this variable and discretionary accruals. 
 
5.1.2.5 Operating Tenure 
 
Company operating age and discretionary accruals have an inconclusive relationship. Older 
companies are expected to have stable internal control mechanisms which should lead to 
lower discretionary accruals. However, a company that is in the early phase of its life is 
always likely to have more discretionary accruals than a mature company. Thus it is posited 
that as the age of business operation increases the possibility of discretionary accruals 
decreases. On the other hand, it can be argued that companies that have been in the market 
for a long time may not be too concerned about the reaction of the market to news about the 
existence of discretionary accruals. In this case there would be a positive association between 
the age of the company and discretionary accruals. 
 
5.1.3 MEASUREMENT OF CONTROL VARIABLES 
 
In this study, leverage, return on assets (ROA), and firm size are considered to be control 
variables.  
 
5.1.3.1 Leverage 
 
Leverage indicates business risk in terms of external financing. A company with more 
leverage indicates higher debt contribution in terms of its financial structure. A firm that has 
higher leverage is more likely to have higher discretionary accruals in order to manage their 
external financing and to show a better asset structure with higher revenue performance. 
Leverage is therefore considered a control variable in the multivariate equation (Bradbury, 
Mak, & Tan, 2006). 
 
5.1.3.2 Return on Assets 
 
Return on assets is the indicator of financial performance of an organisation as it reflects how 
effectively and efficiently the resources are being utilised. It is expected that companies with 
higher ROA have lower discretionary accruals, and that there will be a negative relationship 
with discretionary accruals. 
 
 
5.1.3.3 Firm Size 
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Controlling for firm size is common in earnings management research. It is expected that a 
large firm will have relatively higher discretionary accruals compared to a small firm since a 
large firm generally will have diversified or decentralised management decision-making. A 
diversified decision-making process leads to higher discretionary accruals for business. It is 
expected that there is a positive relationship between firm size and discretionary accruals. 
 
5.1.4 SECTOR DUMMY MEASURE 
 
To evaluate the business sector effect, a sector dummy variable was considered to be 
relevant. Following the NZX index categories, sample companies are divided into 6 different 
sectors to obtain representative samples for each sector. The sectors are: service, primary, 
energy, goods, property and investment. while the service sector is used as the intercept for 
regression analysis to avoid the dummy variable trap (Gujarati, 2003). Information existing 
on the same sector is categorised as ‘1’ and otherwise ‘0’ for sector dummy. 
 
5.2 Multivariate Regression Model 
 
Considering all the above explanatory variables the following general multivariate regression 
model is prepared: 
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where: 
itDAC    = Discretionary Accruals (Jones Model, Modified Jones Model,   
       Performance Matched Model, Performance Matched Free Cash  
      Flow Model); 
Re _ itg Dummy   = Regulation Dummy; 
tCGI    = Corporate Governance Index in year t; 
tContShr    = Control Shareholding in year t; 
tNZXListTen   = NZX Listing Tenure in year t; 
 tOperatingTen       = Operating Tenure in year t; 
 tLeverage    = Leverage in year t; 
tROA   = Return on Assets in year t; 
1−tTA    = Total Assets in year (t-1) as a proxy of firm size; 
 ∑
5
1
_ tDummySector  = Sector Dummy for 1, 2 … 5; 
ϕ     = Coefficient of respective variables 1, 2 …15; 
ξ     = Error term. 
This model is used for all the measurements of discretionary accruals calculation in 
the next section. Discretionary accruals are the dependent variable used to measure 
managerial opportunistic behaviour impact on earnings. 
 
6 Results 
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The objective of this paper was to investigate the effect of corporate governance regulations 
on managerial accruals (discretionary accruals) in New Zealand listed companies. First the 
results of descriptive statistics are presented then, in the following sections, results of 
correlation analysis,; abnormal accruals and multivariate analysis are illustrated. 
 
6.1 Descriptive Statistics 
 
The descriptive statistics for the key variables are presented in Table 3. This table shows a 
descriptive analysis pre and post regulation, including the total sample of different variables. 
Average discretionary accruals for the Jones Model, Modified Jones Model, Performance 
Matched Model and Performance Matched Free Cash Flow Model are close to zero, implying 
that the average descriptive statistics of discretionary accruals did not provide any sensible 
evidence to conclude. Total accruals were mainly captured by sales and fixed assets like 
property plant and equipment scaling. Discretionary accruals are captured on the unexplained 
variable of the regression with descriptive statistics evidenced with the value consistent in all 
the models of accrual measure. Average corporate governance compliance increased from 
0.52 to 0.55 as a result of regulatory impact. The average operating tenure of business is 28 
years whereas average listing tenure, significantly less at 12 years, implies that firms take 
time to list on the stock exchange after incorporation. The average listing years indicates that 
firms listed in the capital market at the growth level of business. 
 
6.2 Correlation Analysis 
 
Correlation analysis is conducted to find the relationship strength among independent and 
dependent variables. Table 4, the Correlation Matrix, shows all the models of total accruals 
measurement and independent variable relationships. None of the independent variables have 
steady unique correlation with discretionary accruals in all models. The Jones model has 
significant correlation with the corporate governance index (r = -0.079 at the 10% level) and 
return on assets (r = 0.323, at the 1% level). The modified Jones model is correlated with the 
same variables as corporate governance index (r = -0.087) with 5% level of significance and 
return on assets (r = 0.369) with 1% level of significance. In both cases, the corporate 
governance index has a negative relationship with discretionary accruals, indicating that 
better corporate governance practice reduces discretionary accruals as a proxy of earnings 
management. 
Companies’ performance as ROA having a positive relationship with discretionary 
accruals indicates that higher performing companies show statistically significant higher 
discretionary accruals. McNichols (2000) also claims that Jones and Modified Jones Models 
of discretionary accruals have positive relationships with ROA. The performance matched 
discretionary accruals model is correlated with business operating tenure (r =-0.108) only. 
Finally, the free cash flow discretionary accruals model correlated with the corporate 
governance index (r = -0.109), business operating tenure (r = 0.216), leverage (r = -0.124) 
and primary sector (r = 0.126) at 5% level of significance. The correlation coefficient is 
checked for higher collinearity among regressors. It can be seen from the correlation matrix 
that there is no high correlation among variables. As a result, collinearity is no threat to the 
independence of regression reported in the following sections. 
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Table 3  
Descriptive Analysis 
Details Mean Median Standard Deviation 
 Pre-
Regulation 
Post-
Regulation 
All 
Sample 
Pre-
Regulation 
Post-
Regulation 
All 
Sample 
Pre-
Regulation 
Post-
Regulation 
All 
Sample 
Discretionary Accruals – Jones Model -0.001 0.001 0.001 0.006 0.019 0.012 0.268 0.141 0.214 
Discretionary Accruals – Modified 
Jones Model -0.005 0.018 0.00648 0.007 0.018 0.0136 0.278 0.140 0.22053 
Discretionary Accruals – Performance 
Matched Model 0.001 0.000 0.000 -0.009 0.002 -0.00385 0.196 0.122 0.16268 
Discretionary Accruals – Performance 
Matched Free Cash Flow Model 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.099 0.178 0.141 1.800 1.666 1.733 
Regulation Dummy 0.000 1.000 0.5 0.000 1.000 0.5 0.000 0.000 0.5 
Corporate Governance Index (CGI) 0.519 0.554 0.536 0.500 0.550 0.5 0.120 0.126 0.124 
CGI * Regulation Dummy 0.000 0.554 0.277 0.000 0.550 0.15 0.000 0.126 0.291 
Listing Tenure 12.057 16.046 14.052 8.000 12.000 10 11.505 11.558 11.693 
Operating Tenure 28.700 32.707 30.704 16.000 20.000 18 34.265 34.261 34.291 
Return on Assets 0.058 0.087 0.072 0.096 0.100 0.099 0.426 0.321 0.377 
Total Assets (t-1) 2706993 1741694 2224343 120109 192802 145571.5 18895582 6008815 14016282 
Primary Sector 0.000 0.157 0.079 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.365 0.269 
Energy Sector 0.000 0.129 0.064 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.335 0.245 
Goods Sector 0.000 0.071 0.036 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.258 0.186 
Property Sector 0.000 0.114 0.057 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.319 0.232 
Investment Sector 0.000 0.071 0.036 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.258 0.186 
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Table 4 
Correlation Matrix 
Variables 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 
Jones Discretionary 
Accruals (1) 1 0.987** 0.745 -0.201* 0.062 -0.079* 0.051 -.007 0.032 -0.002 -0.028 .323** 0.010 -0.024 0.014 0.017 0.036 -0.012 
Modified Jones 
Discretionary 
Accruals (2) 
 1 .738** -.191** 0.054 -.087* 0.043 -0.016 0.024 0 0.02 .369** 0.01 0.022 0.014 0.017 0.039 -0.004 
Performance Matched 
Discretionary 
Accruals (3) 
  1 -.259** 0.00 -0.026 -0.01 -0.028 0.013 -.108* 0.042 0.005 -0.019 0.039 -0.035 -0.02 -0.036 0.032 
Free Cash Flow 
Discretionary 
Accruals (4) 
   1 0.00 -.109** -0.032 0.043 0.018 .216** -.124** -0.009 0.016 .126** 0.033 0.000 -0.001 0.064 
Regulation Dummy 
(5)     1 .140** .952** 0.028 .171** 0.058 0.062 0.039 -0.034 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Corporate Governance 
Index (6)      1 .351** 0.005 .119** .089* 0.002 -.163** -0.002 -.152** .116** -.084* -.184** -.171** 
Interaction of CGI and 
REGDUMMY (7)       1 0.026 .182** 0.072 0.031 0.015 -0.04 -0.026 0.027 -0.01 -0.041 -0.036 
Controlling 
Shareholdings (8)        1 -.108* 0.021 -.151** -0.028 .097* -.089* -.104* -.108* .183** -.170** 
NZX Listing Tenure 
(9)         1 .258** -0.052 -0.045 -.095* 0.063 0.053 -0.004 -0.009 -0.004 
Business Operating 
Tenure (10)          1 -.164** 0.043 .112** -.180** .214** -.113** 0.023 -.112** 
Leverage (11)           1 0.021 -0.025 -0.056 -0.038 -0.045 .176** -0.012 
Return On Assets (12)            1 0.014 -.095* 0.067 0.064 .149** 0.037 
Total Assets (13)             1 -0.053 .160** -0.02 -0.015 -0.027 
Primary Sector (14)              1 -.166** -.120** -.155** -.120** 
Energy Sector (15)               1 -.107* -.138** -.107* 
Goods Sector (16)                1 -.100* -0.077 
Property Sector (17)                 1 -.100* 
Investment Sector 
(18)                  1 
***  Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed)  
**       Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed) 
*         Correlation is significant at the 0.10 level (2-tailed) 
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6.3 Abnormal Accruals 
 
This section explains the overall accruals measurement and explanatory power of 
Performance Matched Free Cash Flow Model. Three other established accruals measurement 
models are also calculated to compare with our model (Performance Matched Free Cash Flow 
Model) in explaining coefficients. Table 5 shows the explanatory power of all models. 
 
Table 5 
Coefficient of Accruals Model 
 
Models Adjusted R2 Intercept 
Total Assets 
Reciprocal 
Revenue 
Coefficient 
Property 
Plant and 
Equipment 
Coefficient 
ROA 
coefficient 
Jones Model 0.204  (48.861)*** 
-922.871  
(-8.856)*** 
0.03 
(8.974)*** 
0.019 
(1.803)**  - -  
Modified 
Jones Model 
0.201  
(48.014)*** 
-925.144  
(-8.859)*** 
0.03  
(8.840)*** 
0.02  
(1.880)**  - -  
Performance 
Matched 
Model 
0.316  
(65.429)*** 
0.025  
(1.846)* 
-859.579  
(-8.578)*** 
0.029 
(9.298)*** 
-0.034  
(-2.688)** 
0.282 
(9.592)*** 
Performance 
Matched Free 
Cash Flow 
Model 
0.228  
(42.193)*** 
-0.355  
(-3.121)** 
-8762.579 
(-10.223)*** 
0.006  
(0.239)* 
-0.008  
(-0.072) 
1.709 
(6.792)*** 
* Correlation significant at the 0.10 level (2-tailed)  
** Correlation significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed)  
*** Correlation significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed) 
 
Table 5 shows that the Jones Model (1991) and Modified Jones Model (1995) both have 
almost 20% explanatory power at the 1% significant level. Moreover, all the determinants are 
statistically significant as total assets reciprocals and revenue coefficients. The Performance 
Matched Model (2005) has 31.6% explanatory power at 1% level of significance. The 
determinants of the performance matched model; total assets reciprocal, revenue coefficient, 
property plant and equipment coefficient and ROA coefficients are statistically significant. 
Finally, the performance matched free cash flow model has 22.8% explanatory power with 
1% level of significance. Performance Matched Free Cash Flow Model determinants such as 
total assets reciprocal, revenue coefficient and ROA coefficient, are statistically significant, 
except property plant and equipment that is significant at more than the 10% level. 
Table 6 shows the signs of regression for each of the variables in all models. Following 
basic accrual measurement process, revenue and fixed assets measurement is the key to 
calculating non-discretionary accruals. The coefficient of change in sales is positive because 
the sales of a profitable firm exceed its expenses and the net working capital will be positive 
if the credit policies of the firm and suppliers are similar. Conversely the coefficient on 
property, plant and equipment is negative because it determines the depreciation expenses 
(Ronen & Yaari, 2007). 
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Table6 
Regressor’s Sign & Coefficients on each of the Model and Variables 
 
Details Expected Sign Jones Model 
Modified Jones 
Model 
Performance 
Matched 
Model 
Performance 
Matched Free 
Cash Flow 
Model 
Total 
Accruals +/- 
(Positive: 222; 
Negative: 338) 
(Positive: 218; 
Negative: 342) 
(Positive: 219; 
Negative: 341) 
(Positive: 270; 
Negative: 290) 
Reciprocals of 
Assets 
Coefficient 
? - - - - 
Revenue & 
Receivables 
Coefficient 
+ 
+(Positive: 390; 
Negative:170) 
=30.36% 
+(Positive: 409; 
Negative:151) 
=26.96% 
+ (Positive: 391; 
Negative:169) 
= 30.18% 
+(Positive: 390; 
Negative: 170) 
= 30.36% 
Property, 
Plant and 
Equipment 
Coefficient 
- + + - - 
Performance 
Indicator 
(ROA) 
coefficient 
? Not Applicable Not Applicable 
+ (Positive: 458; 
Negative: 102) 
= 18.21% 
+(Positive: 458; 
Negative: 102) 
= 18.21% 
 
Table 6 shows that 30.36% of individual regressors (revenue receivables coefficient –ve 
170) have negative values in the Jones Model and the overall coefficient is positive as 
expected, whereas Jones (1991) found in 39% of the regressions the coefficient of change in 
sales is negative. Similarly, the Modified Jones Model (1995) has 26.96% and the 
Performance Matched Model(S.P. Kothari, et al., 2005) has 30.18% negative change in sales 
coefficients. The Performance Matched Free Cash Flow Model also shows 30.36% of sales 
coefficients are negative, which is comparatively stronger than the Jones Model, Modified 
Jones Model and Performance Matched Model. Property, plant and equipment were expecting 
a negative coefficient, however, the Jones and Modified Jones Model both found positive 
coefficients with accruals unlike the Performance Matched and Performance Matched Free 
Cash Flow model. This change is a significant improvement in the Performance Matched Free 
Cash Flow Model and evidenced that higher returns on assets generate higher income 
changing accruals. The performance indicator coefficient, ROA, shows 18.21% of negative 
individual regressors with positive coefficients, which indicates profit increasing accruals. 
 
6.4 Multivariate Analysis 
 
This section presents the results of multivariate regression for all the significant methods of 
the study, including expected coefficient directions of variables. Jones’ Model is the pioneer 
of accruals calculation, followed by the Modified Jones Model, where our analysis found that, 
among all variables, the Modified Jones Model has more significant effects on NZX listing 
tenure, business operating tenure and return on assets (ROA), with the 2R  value marginally 
higher in the Modified Jones Model (20.6%) compared to the Jones Model (19.8%) for these 
variables. The Fisher test shows both models are significant at a 1% level with acceptable 
levels of Durbin-Watson value reflecting no auto correlation in the model. As a rule of thumb, 
a Durbin-Watson test value lower than 2 is an acceptable level of auto correlation in the 
model. 
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Table 7 
Multivariate Analysis of the Determinant of Discretionary Accruals 
Variables Jones Model Modified Jones Model 
Performance 
Matched 
Model 
Performance 
Matched Free Cash 
Flow Model 
Constant 0.006 (0.274) 
0.015 
(0.708) 
0.022 
(0.197) 
0.147 
(0.0828) 
Regulation Dummy 0.004 (0.155) 
-0.005 
(.182) 
0.021 
(0.861) 
0.523 
(2.501)** 
Corporate Governance 
Index 
-0.043 
(-1.230) 
-0.054 
(-1.527) 
-0.038 
(-1.178) 
-0.757 
(-2.42)*** 
Corporate Governance 
Index * Regulation 
Dummy 
0.020 
(0.434) 
0.031 
(0.688) 
-0.033 
(-0.769) 
-0.701 
(-1.800)* 
Control Shareholder -0.003 (-0.430) 
-0.005 
(-0.760) 
-0.005 
(-0.879) 
0.360 
(5.925)*** 
Listing Tenure 0.001 (2.885)*** 
0.001 
(2.456)** 
0.001 
(3.712)*** 
-0.005 
(-2.300)** 
Operating Tenure -0.001 (-3.012)*** 
-0.001 
(-2.905)*** 
-0.001 
(-5.70)*** 
0.005 
(4.496)*** 
Leverage 0.006 (0.459) 
-0.001 
(-0.038) 
0.017 
(1.338) 
0.028 
(0.257) 
Return on Assets 0.208 (9.036) 
0.233 
(9.609)*** 
0.021 
(1.178) 
-0.588 
(-3.878)*** 
Total Assets (t-1) 0.000 (1.103) 
0.000 
(1.086) 
0.000 
(-0.250) 
0.000 
(0.120) 
Primary Sector Dummy -0.004 (-0.344) 
-0.002 
(-0.179) 
-0.018 
(-1.954)* 
0.454 
(5.668)*** 
Energy Sector Dummy -0.004 (-0.519) 
-0.005 
(-0.643) 
-0.006 
(-0.745) 
0.270 
(3.158)*** 
Goods Sector Dummy 0.003 (0.246) 
-0.001 
(-0.092) 
-0.027 
(-2.199)** 
0.315 
(3.020)*** 
Property Sector Dummy -0.003 (-0.308) 
-0.004 
(-0.398) 
-0.018 
(-2.113)** 
-0.025 
(-0.289) 
Investment Sector 
Dummy 
-0.030 
(-2.299) 
-0.028 
(-0.917)* 
-0.010 
(-1.027) 
0.290 
(2.884)** 
R-squared 0.198 0.206 0.116 0.171 
Adjusted R-squared 0.177 0.186 0.093 0.149 
S.E. of regression 0.197 0.199 0.159 1.429 
F-statistic 9.597 10.119 5.115 8.000 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Durbin-Watson stat 1.327 1.292 1.547 1.711 
        *, **, *** Correlation significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% level (2-tailed) 
 
Sample companies were categorised by 6 sectors, therefore 5 sector dummy variables 
are used in analysis. Only the service sector has no dummy to avoid the dummy variable trap 
which is the situation of perfect collinearity (Gujarati, 2003). In other words, ( 1ϕ ) represents 
the intercept of the service sector and ,11ϕ ,12ϕ ,13ϕ ,14ϕ and ,15ϕ  are the differential intercept 
coefficients reflecting the intercept of other sectors; Goods, Primary, Property, Energy and 
Investment respectively. 
Performance Matched Model regression found NZX listing tenure, Operating tenure, 
Goods, Property and Energy sectors are statistically significant. This model has comparatively 
lower 2R  with a predictive value of 11.6% at the 1% significance level. Moreover, a Durbin-
Watson test value of 1.547 indicates no auto correlation in the model. 
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Finally, the Performance Matched Free Cash Flow Model shows relatively higher 
significance of variables. Bradbury et al. (2006), in research about NZ firms found adjusted 
2R  = 0.075 to 0.089 at the 1% level of significance using different specifications of Modified 
Jones Model (1995). The coefficient of regulation dummy for the Jones Model, Modified 
Jones Model, Performance Matched Model and Performance Matched Free Cash Flow Model 
is respectively 0.004, -0.005, 0.021 and 0.523. Of all the models, The Performance Matched 
Free Cash Flow Model has significance at the 5% level with regulation. As mentioned above, 
regulations have a positive impact on earnings management and H01 is not rejected for the 
Jones Model, Performance Matched Model and Performance Matched Free Cash Flow 
Model. However, the Modified Jones Model alone shows a negative coefficient. It indicates 
that the existence of regulation reduces earnings management opportunity. In other words, a 
more regulated company environment minimises the opportunistic management behaviour. 
Firms with higher corporate governance compliance have reduced opportunistic 
management attitudes which ensure higher accountability and reporting quality (Aguilera, 
2005; Sinha, 2006). The coefficients of the corporate governance index for the Jones Model, 
Modified Jones Model, Performance Matched Model and Performance Matched Free Cash 
Flow Model are -0.043, -0.054, -0.038 and -0.757 respectively. The entire set of coefficients 
indicates a negative association of the corporate governance index with discretionary accruals; 
indicating higher compliance of corporate governance reduces managerial accruals. 
Performance Matched Free Cash Flow Model has statistical significance at the 1% level. The 
interaction coefficient of the corporate governance index and regulation dummy (Corporate 
Governance Index * Regulation dummy) shows an expected negative association for both the 
Performance Matched Model and Performance Matched Free Cash Flow Model as -0.033 and 
-0.701 (at 10% level of significance); however, the Jones Model and Modified Jones Model 
have positive coefficients of 0.020 and 0.031 with more than a 10% level of significance. 
Compliant corporate governance ensures independent boards, audit processes and strong 
internal control systems which reduce managerial discretion. H02 is thus rejected and 
indicates that higher corporate governance compliance with regulation reduces discretionary 
accruals. In summary, H01 and H02, results indicate that the existence of corporate 
governance regulation alone does not reduce managerial opportunistic behaviour but 
regulation with higher compliance of corporate governance does reduce managerial 
discretion. 
The coefficient for Control Shareholdings in the Performance Matched Free Cash 
Flow Model is calculated as 0.360, statistically significant at a 1% level. However, the 
coefficient for the Jones Model, Modified Jones Model and Performance Matched Free Cash 
Flow Model is calculated as -0.003, -0.005 and -0.005 respectively, at more than a 10% level 
of statistical significance. The positive association of discretionary accruals and control 
shareholdings is consistent with the rejection of H03, suggesting that concentrated ownership 
holds significant control over management incurring discretionary accruals (Bradbury, et al., 
2006). Control shareholders have significant influence in selecting directors and CEOs of 
firms which indirectly influences managerial discretion.  
The coefficients of firm operating tenure for the Jones Model, Modified Jones Model, 
Performance Matched Model and Performance Matched Free Cash Flow Models are -0.001, -
0.001, -0.001 and 0.005 respectively. Firm operating tenure is statistically significant at the 
1% level for each of the models. Firms operating for longer terms having higher discretionary 
accruals were supported in rejecting H04.  
The coefficient of the Jones Model, Modified Jones Model, and Performance Matched 
Models for listing tenure is 0.001 each while the Performance Matched Free Cash Flow 
Models shows 0.005. Moreover, stock exchange listing tenure is statistically significant at a 
5% level for both the Modified Jones Model and Performance Matched Free Cash Flow 
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Model, and similarly, at a 1% level of significance for the Jones Model and Performance 
Matched Model. As argued, stock exchange listing tenure has statistically significant negative 
associations in the Performance Matched Model therefore H05 is rejected. 
Performance indicator ROA has a negative coefficient of -0.588 for the Performance Matched 
Free Cash Flow Model with 1% level significance and the Modified Jones Model has a 
coefficient of 0.233 at that level. However, the Jones Model and Performance Matched Model 
do not have any statistical significance with discretionary accruals. The negative association 
indicates that high performance reduces managerial discretion: managers are still de-
motivated when they meet targeted performance. However, leverage and firm size do not 
show any statistical significance at the 10% level. 
Among NZX listed companies; primary, energy and goods sectors show statistical 
significance at a 1% level in the Performance Matched Free Cash Flow Model. Similarly, the 
Investment sector shows a 5% level of significance in the same Model. The Performance 
Matched Model shows significance in the Primary sector at a 10% level; goods and property 
sector returns at a 5% level of significance.  The Modified Jones Model indicates a 10% level 
of significance for the investment sector only. However, none of the sectors result in 
statistical significance for the Jones Model. Therefore, compared with four measures of 
discretionary accruals, the Performance Matched Free Cash Flow Model reflects more 
significance in a sectoral analysis of managerial discretion. Finally, the existing interaction 
between corporate governance and regulation suggests a negative coefficient, as expected. 
This implies that existing regulations enhance corporate governance compliance that 
subsequently reduces discretionary accruals. 
 
7 Conclusions and Remarks 
 
This paper expands the stream of earnings management model using discretionary accruals, 
implementing free cash flow and documenting that firms demonstrating higher compliance of 
corporate governance have relatively lower discretionary accruals. The free cash flow 
measure is one of the very few observable inputs available in discretionary accruals models. 
Earnings management literature evidenced that accruals models are suitable for explanation 
using cash flow type operating activities.  
The results depict corporate governance compliance increasing the accountability of 
management and reducing financial discretion in decision making. Moreover, New Zealand 
Stock Exchange listed companies are compelled to follow corporate governance regulation 
and provide better monitoring of earnings with consequently lower discretionary accruals. 
Discretionary accruals reduce relatively in growing firms and those in the initial stage of 
operation. Managerial discretion reduces as corporate governance regulation compliance 
improves and minimises discretionary accruals. This paper finds evidence consistent with the 
proposition that firms complying with corporate governance regulation have more efficient 
monitoring compared to low compliance firms. 
An additional contribution of this paper is to determine that a regulated environment 
of corporate governance reduces managerial opportunistic behaviour. Moreover, the evidence 
shows the ‘comply or explain’ nature of soft regulation is effective in New Zealand and that it 
reduces managerial discretionary accruals. The findings of this paper are beneficial for not 
only New Zealand corporate governance legislators but for other countries in developing or 
restoring corporate governance guidelines. 
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